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1. Introduction: the effort debate 
 
Whether political philosophers like it or not, the public regards effort as a base for desert 
(McLeod, 2013; Swift, 2014: 42). The use of effort as a measure to judge and be judged by seems 
indefeasible. Hence, social justice and effort are linked in the eyes of the public. The idea that those 
who exert more effort deserve more than others manifests itself in many areas, such as in a large 
number of popular motivational quotes1 and religious texts2. It is assumed that every person, 
irrespective of any other abilities and circumstances, possesses the ability to exert some form of 
effort, which they are also expected and required to actually exert, at least as a prerequisite for 
receiving resources from society. The Dutch government, for example, expects effort from 
handicapped veterans in their reintegration process as a precondition for compensation and 
assistance (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2011: 30). Dutch social security claimants are 
expected to show effort in return for receiving basic social security (Rijksoverheid, 2015). Those who 
fail to make an effort — with the exception of underage children or the mentally ill — become 
outcasts of society, get labelled ‘lazy’ and are condemned3. These examples show how deep the 
popular embrace of effort as a desert base is anchored in society. Conventional and widely supported 
as it is, this view may not be the alpha and omega of views on effort. This is where political 
philosophy makes its entry, quester for truth and clarity (Swift, 2014: 3) and fierce opponent of the 
conventional view on effort. 
 
Dominant contemporary political philosophy rejects effort as a base for desert. Rawls and 
Nozick, two of the most prominent twentieth-century political philosophers (Swift, 2014: 11, 31; 
Estlund, 2012: 3), both condemn the use of effort as a desert base, although for very different 
reasons4. Effort as a base for desert is assessed as either impractical and morally arbitrary (Rawls, 
2009: 329; Cohen, 2011: 11; Swift: 41, 43) or irrelevant5 (Nozick, 1974: 160-164; Swift, 40). The two 
                                                          
1. e.g. “What is written without effort is in general read without pleasure.” ; “People pretend not to like grapes when the vines are too high 
for them to reach.”; “Walls don't fall without effort.”; “No one ever drowned in sweat.”; “Determination, effort and practice are rewarded 
with success.”; “About the only thing that comes to us without effort is old age.” (“Quotes About Effort”, 2015), etc. etc.    
2. e.g. In Christianity: “And whatsoever ye do, do [it] heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men” (Colossians 3:22 King James Bible); in 
Buddhism: “And what, monks, is right effort? (…) He generates desire, endeavours, activates persistence, upholds and exerts his intent for 
the sake of the arising of skilful qualities that have not yet arisen. He generates desire, endeavours, activates persistence, upholds and 
exerts his intent for the maintenance, non-confusion, increase, plenitude, development, and culmination of skilful qualities that have 
arisen” (Bhikku, 1996).   
3. e.g. Sloth, i.e. laziness, is a deadly sin: “The desire of the slothful killed him; for his hands refuse to labour” (Proverbs 21:25 King James 
Bible); Mitt Romney’s famous ’47%’ quote: “There are 47 percent of the people who will vote for the president no matter what...who are 
dependent upon government, who believe that they are victims. […] These are people who pay no income tax. […] and so my job is not to 
worry about those people. I'll never convince them that they should take personal responsibility and care for their lives.” (Romney, 2012). 
4. See Cohen (2011: 9-11); Dworkin (2000: 112-119) and Swift (2014: 40-43).  
5. This thesis ignores the Nozickian view on effort in what follows, partly due to limits in time and scope and partly due to the nature of 
Nozick’s central message, which delegitimises many ideas on equality and justice pertaining to the debate on effort, unless one attacks the 
central message itself. Nozick’s view on effort here only serves as an example for the philosophical rejection of the conventional view on 
effort.    
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major theorists on social justice strongly oppose the conventional belief that rewarding effort is just 
(Swift, 2014: 41). The public is not convinced by their arguments: the conventional view, which was 
already articulated in ancient sources6, has not been shaken in the forty years since Rawls and Nozick 
formulated their theories. There seems to be a serious rift between philosophy and the public where 
the debate on effort is concerned. 
 
Both sides in the effort debate have their weak points. Although the conventional view, 
where effort is a base for desert, connects to our basic intuition about justice (Knight, 2011: 153), it is 
incoherent and flawed (see chapter 3). On the other hand, the philosophical rejection of effort as a 
base for desert is dogmatic and belied by human activity all around the world (see chapter 4). 
However, as will be made clear, it is more developed and based on stronger arguments than the 
conventional view. A developed argument that defends the use of effort as a desert base should 
integrate the strong aspects of both views. The main aim of this thesis is to construct such an 
argument. The essential part of such an argument consists of a conception of effort that could both 
serve as a desert base and be based on arguments instead of intuitions. It should attack both the 
conventional view and Rawls’s rejection of effort as a base for desert in order to be supported. Note 
that this thesis is not about desert, but about effort and its possible use as a base for desert7. I wish 
to defend my position in the effort debate. The Roemerian (1998) view on effort will be used as a 
starting point for the construction and defence of this position. Yet, the Roemerian view should be 
improved on before I can support it. These improvements will increase the defensibility of Roemer’s 
view on effort vis-à-vis the other two views. However, before launching into a detailed discussion, I 
would first like to focus on the concept of effort itself.  
  
                                                          
6. See footnote 2.  
7. In this thesis a desert base means nothing more than ‘a human activity which deserves reward’. With the use of this definition I assume 
automatically that (1) some human actions deserve praise and others deserve disapproval, depending on many factors such as the 
situation or intentions of actors and (2) people have the ability to make judgements about the desirability of human actions.    
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2. What is effort? 
 
2.1. Two kinds of effort  
 
 The word ‘effort’ refers to many different complex concepts. Effort can both refer to a 
determined (or intended) attempt and to the result of that attempt (The New Oxford American 
Dictionary, 2005). Effort is also seen as a means towards a goal: in order to achieve something (i.e. 
results, achievements, advantages or success), effort, in the form of physical or mental activity, is 
needed (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2015). All these usages of effort can be found in everyday 
language, but for this thesis they are not specific enough. I therefore make a distinction between 
effort as an ability (i.e. ability effort) and effort as an activity (i.e. activity effort). Effort as a result is 
excluded from this thesis, for reasons that will be discussed at the end of this section. A person can 
possess the ability to make an effort but not transform it into activity, which leads to the absence of 
activity. Activity effort, or ac, appears in either physical or mental form. Hence, without any physical 
or mental activity there can be no ac. By definition, it follows that ability effort, or ab, is a condition 
for ac: without ab it is impossible to exert ac. Conversely, ab can exist without ac, although it may 
well be impossible to find out whether a person possesses ab when he never transforms it into ac. 
Apart from this practical objection there is no reason to reject that ab is independent of ac. Note that 
ab is possessed by persons and ac is exerted by persons. The desired goals of a person should also be 
taken into account. Can a person possess or exert any kind of effort without having a desired goal? A 
person who lacks any desire to reach goals can still possess ab, but they will not transform it into ac 
without a desired goal because ac is an attempt to achieve an end.  
 
Now the meaning of and interrelationship between the two kinds of effort has been 
established, I would like to discuss the measurement of effort. Some form of effort quantification is 
needed if we assume that effort is a desert base: deciding what a person deserves on the basis of the 
effort he possesses or exerts is impossible without a measure of effort. In order to measure effort I 
assume the following assumptions to be true:  
1. Effort can be measured in values that correspond with different levels of possession or 
exertion (e.g. 5 ac, which is more than 3 ac).  
2. Effort can be measured as an interval variable (Bryman, 2008: 321): the distance 
between the levels is identical across the range (e.g. the distance between 5 ac and 4 ac 
is the same as the distance between 4 ac and 3 ac).  
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3. Effort values are nonnegative, i.e. larger than zero8 (Roemer, 1998: 7). 
4. Effort values are one-dimensional (Roemer, 1998: 7) in analogy of Marx’s (1976: 293-294) 
objectification of labour. They are composed of one, given variable (e.g. ab is expressed 
in ab values, that are given and are not a function of different factors). In this thesis I 
assume that we can know ab and ac of a person: these values are expressed in numbers, 
which correspond to different levels of effort. There is no direct relation between this 
measure and reality, which shall be discussed in chapter 6.3.  
These assumptions solve many practical problems9. Under these assumptions a person with an ab of 
0 has no ab whatsoever. A person with an ab of 10 has less ab than a person with an ab of 20. The 
level of ab is the maximum effort one could transform into ac (within a limited time). For example, a 
person with an ab of 10 would only be able to exert half the ac that a person with an ab of 20 could. 
Note that the ac of a person can never exceed his ab. In this absolute measure ab and ac are 
measured the same: an ab of 6 is equal to an ac of 6.   
 
Yet, there is no undisputed measure of ac. What should be measured? The total amount of 
ac a person exerts, or the relative transformation of his ab into ac? I call the first measure absolute 
ac, which measures the absolute level of exertion a person delivers in the form of physical or mental 
activity in order to achieve a desired goal (Roemer, 1998: 11-12). The second measure is named 
relative ac (or rac) and measures a person’s physical or mental activity in order to achieve a desired 
goal relative to the degree of his maximum ability of exertion (Roemer, 1998: 11-12). A person’s rac 
is his degree of effort.  Absolute ac is measured in levels of activity, independent of ability effort. 
Note again that a person’s absolute ac can never exceed that person’s ab. Rac is measured in ab: it is 
dependent on ab and expressed in a percentage of transformed ab. Hence, the rac of a person with 
an ab of 10 and an ac of 5 is 50%10.  
 
 At the start of this section we saw that effort can also refer to result (i.e. achievements, 
advantage or success) in ordinary language. Yet this kind of effort is excluded from this thesis. Result 
and effort have a very complex relation. Effort is not a condition for result: some results, such as 
stumbling upon a gold nugget, hardly require any effort. The amount of ac exerted has no clear 
relation to the result: a brilliant painter could paint a masterpiece with little activity while the result 
of this little ac can be huge. Or, vice versa, a dyslexic student could exert a large amount of ac while 
the result of this ac is rather small. Result is a function of many factors, such as talent and luck. Effort 
                                                          
8. Negative effort does not exist: both negative ab and negative ac cannot exist due to the ab and ac definitions. 
9. Also see chapter 6.3. 
10. 𝑟𝑎𝑐 =  
𝑎𝑐
𝑎𝑏
 (also see chapter 2.3). 
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can be one of its factors, but this is not necessary nor sufficient in many cases. Another problem is 
that ac is an attempt towards a desired goal: it can be successful, but it can also fail. By this 
reasoning, the measurement of result in relation to effort is also problematic: it is expressed in social 
situations (e.g. respect) or material commodities (e.g. prizes). These cannot serve as a measure of 
effort because they are polluted with other functions of those situations or commodities. A salary is 
not just the result of successful ac (in this case working), but also an exchange and a means of 
payment, just like harvested fruit is not only the result of successful ac, but also serves as nutrition 
and as ingredients for other products. This ‘pollution’ in the expression of result and the complex 
relation between effort and result are to blame for the exclusion of result (i.e. achievements, 
advantages or success) as a separate kind of effort in this thesis.  
 
The distinction between ac and ab on the one hand and between absolute ac and rac on the 
other, raises vital questions that are useful for the discussion whether effort should be a base for 
desert. If effort is a desert base, what kind of effort should be rewarded: only ab, only ac or both11? 
And should we opt for the absolute or relative measure of ac? These questions, and their relation to 
the effort debate, will be discussed in chapters 3 to 5, which consist of a presentation of three views 
on effort (the conventional, the extreme and the Roemerian). Yet the final question, about absolute 
and relative effort, cannot be answered without providing a context in which to choose between 
absolute and relative effort as a measure. This context is shaped in the following section of this 
chapter.  
 
2.2. Effort and the choice-circumstance distinction  
 
 The introduction of relative effort as a measure of ac, i.e. ac expressed in percentages of the 
maximum possible effort (i.e. ab), adds another layer to the debate on effort and forces us to rethink 
the relationship between ab and ac. rac compensates for differences between people in their ability 
to make an effort. rac relates to what I earlier called ‘different forms of effort’ (see chapter 1): the 
idea that not everyone is able to exert an equal amount of ac due to differences between people’s ab 
levels. The degree of effort should measure how hard one tries to achieve a desired goal within their 
options, expressed in a percentage of their maximum possible effort (i.e. ab). In contrast, absolute 
effort only measures how much ac is exerted, irrespective of one’s ab. The choice between absolute 
ac and rac depends on the position one takes on distributive justice and responsibility (Knight & 
                                                          
11. Also see chapters 3-5 and Table 1.  
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Stemplowska, 2011: 1), one of the large debates in political philosophy. How are these topics 
related?  
 
In order to answer that question we first need to form a clear distinction between the two 
effort measures. If we assume that ac is a base for desert and choose absolute effort as a measure, 
this would mean that people should be judged on the basis of the level of ac they choose to exert. 
What else than their own choice could keep a person from exerting vast amounts of ac from the 
perspective of absolute effort? The level of a person‘s ab plays no role here: this only concerns the 
choice to transform ab into ac; there are no other factors in play. Of course, a person’s absolute ac 
cannot exceed his level of ab, but this limitation is not relevant here. What matters, and matters 
only, is the total amount of ac exerted. A person who exerts more ac (i.e. exerting a higher level of 
mental or physical activity in order to achieve a desired end) is more deserving than another person 
who exerts less ac. In other words: this approach is blind to differences in ab between people. If ac is 
selected as a desert base, it rewards people on the basis of their choice to exert ac. If we, on the 
other hand, assume that ac should be a base for desert and choose rac as a measure, it would mean 
that people should be judged on the basis of the degree of ac they choose to exert, with respect to 
their ab . The ab limits the ac one can exert, and — unlike in the absolute ac case — this is taken into 
consideration: what counts is the section of ab that is transformed in ac.  
 
If we assume from this point on that a person cannot alter his level of ab12, there now remain 
two very different measures of ac: absolute ac, which focuses on choice, and rac, which focuses on 
choice adjusted for differences in ability beyond a person’s control, i.e. circumstances. Choice and 
circumstances, and the distinction between them, drive us to the realm of the luck egalitarianism 
school of thought (e.g. Cohen, 2011; Knight & Stemplowska, 2011; Roemer, 1998). Luck 
egalitarianism tries to construct principles of social justice that integrate personal responsibility and 
egalitarianism (Arneson, 2011: 25). This school of thought originates from the critiques of Dworkin on 
Rawls, who favours resource equality above welfare equality (Dworkin, 2000: 13-14, 65; Gosepath, 
2011). Dworkin (2000: 113-114) argues that Rawls (e.g. 2009: 101, 329) does not place enough 
emphasis on the fact that people often make deliberate choices that influence their economic and 
social position. Dworkin (2000: 73-74) introduces two kinds of luck: option luck, which is ‘a matter of 
how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out’, and brute luck, which is about ‘how risks fall out 
that are not (…) deliberate gambles.’ Dworkin (2000: 65-83) supports equality of resources, and 
distinguishes between a person’s ambitions and his endowments (Dworkin, 2000: 286; Knight & 
                                                          
12. The ab assumption should be understood as follows: a person’s ab level is determined by forces beyond the control of this person. He 
cannot change his personal ab level by any action of his own.  
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Stemplowska, 2011: 7). Dworkin (2000: 73-78) argues that an unequal distribution of resources is 
only allowed when it follows from deliberate choices. Dworkin makes a ‘cut’ between preferences 
and endowments (Cohen, 2011: 25-29): people are responsible for their preferences and ambitions13, 
which cannot be equalised, but should be compensated for shortfalls in their endowments (Dworkin, 
2000: 73-83; Goosepath, 2011). Cohen (2011: 4, 13-33) argues that Dworkin misplaced his cut and 
suggests a cut between choice and circumstance, because many preferences and ambitions are not 
freely chosen. Note that both Dworkin and Cohen belief that these cuts are possible to make: this is 
one of the central theorems of luck egalitarianism (Knight & Stemplowska, 2011: 5). According to 
Cohen, people should be held responsible for their genuine choices, and not for circumstances, 
which includes unfree choices (Cohen, 2011: 29-32). Hence, Cohen (2011: 32) moves the debate into 
the realm of the discussion about free will: when are choices really free? This very complex debate 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis, because it is not necessary for our discussion on effort as a 
desert base. Cohen (2011: 4), in opposition to both Rawls and Dworkin, advocates equality of access 
to advantage, because egalitarianism cannot function without a conception of equality of welfare. In 
his version of luck egalitarianism welfare and resources are integrated into equality of access to 
advantage, which promotes compensation for exploitation and brute luck: circumstances should not 
influence distributions (Cohen, 2011: 5).  
 
The concepts of circumstance and choice are, as showed in the previous paragraph, central 
to luck-egalitarian theories. Circumstances are all the aspects that influence a person’s abilities and 
situation outcomes, over which he has no control (Cohen, 2011: 5; Knight & Stemplowska, 2011: 4; 
Roemer, 1998: 6-7). A circumstance is a fact that cannot be altered by a person, such as his genes, 
place of birth, parents or culture14. A choice is the process in which a rational person chooses an 
alternative between different options (e.g. Roemer: 6, 15-16). The existence of such a process has 
two conditions. First, there needs to be more than one alternative to choose between. It is quite 
possible that that a person’s circumstances influence the range of possible alternatives. But 
whenever he is left with more than one alternative after this preselection due to circumstances, a 
choice remains15. Hence, a choice is made in every case where circumstances leave room for more 
than one alternative. Secondly, we assume that people have the ability to choose between different 
alternatives on the basis of their preferences and other thoughts (O’Conner, 2014). Yet, in most 
                                                          
13. Dworkin (2000) makes an exclusion for cravings and addictions, because people would not chose these preferences again.  
14. Of course there can be much debate about to what extent certain facts are beyond a person’s control, but this falls outside of the scope 
of this thesis.  
15. Also see chapter 6.1.  
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situations it is hard, if not impossible, to draw a line between the realms of choice and circumstance, 
because both realms have influenced the situation during its creating process16.   
 
 The choice-circumstance distinction of luck egalitarians is valuable for the debate on effort, 
at least under the assumption that a person is responsible for his choices and not for his 
circumstances. Which part of a person’s ab or ac is an effect of his circumstances (Ci) and which part 
is the product of his choices (Ch)? There are two extreme responses to this question. The first rejects 
the role of choice completely and supports the idea that all the effort (ab and ac) a person exerts or 
possesses is the product of his circumstances. In this view, effort can only serve as base for desert 
when the possession of a particular set of Ci (of which the owner has not had any effect on obtaining 
them) should be rewarded. This idea of rewarding mere circumstances is rejected by both Rawls 
(2009: 329) and the public (Roemer, 1998: 1; Swift, 2014: 41). A denial of the existence of choice in 
the realm of effort is often combined with the rejection of ab and ac as a base for desert. ab is 
determined by Ci17, but ac is likewise solely determined by Ci in this view. This is a rather obscure18 
socialist or egalitarian view (Cohen, 2011: 11), which Roemer (1998: 6-7) calls the deterministic view. 
Rawls is sometimes presented as representative of this view (Cohen, 2011: 11-13; Swift, 2014: 43), 
which will be discussed in chapter 4.  
 
The other extreme response to the choice-circumstance distinction rejects circumstances as 
irrelevant for deliberation about effort. In this view effort can serve as a base for desert when the 
choice to possess ab or exert ac should be rewarded. ab can be influenced by choice in this view. This 
conflicts with the assumption that a person’s ab cannot be altered by this person, i.e. is a 
circumstance. A view that regards the role of circumstances in human life entirely as irrelevant is 
absurd19. Under the ab assumption, we should reject ab as a base for desert because Ch plays no role 
here: ab is a function of Ci. In the case of ac, this is different. In this view the amount of ac a person 
exerts is purely a function of his Ch, and could serve as a base for desert. Both extreme responses to 
the choice-circumstance distinction have major flaws and are not (fully) adopted by any of the views 
on effort I will review in the following chapters. Nevertheless, these extreme responses are 
important to limit the discussion. Parts of these extreme responses are, as we will see, adopted by 
the conventional, extreme and Roemerian view on effort.  
 
                                                          
16. This issue is more fully discussed in chapter 6.1.  
17. See footnote 12.  
18. I have not found a single scholar who advocates this view.  
19. As was the case with footnote 18, I have not found a single scholar who advocates this view. If it was true that circumstances were 
always irrelevant in life, and everything depended on choice, I ask myself why everyone wouldn’t choose to be born without handicaps.  
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2.3. The effort model  
 
 The two previous sections of this chapter can be rendered into a basic model of effort. The 
model simplifies and explains how the choice-circumstance distinction is connected to the distinction 
between ability effort and activity effort. First, I restate the assumptions that were made earlier in 
this chapter.  
𝑎𝑏, 𝑎𝑐, 𝐶𝑖, 𝐶ℎ =  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
𝑎𝑏, 𝑎𝑐, 𝐶𝑖, 𝐶ℎ = ≥ 0  
𝐶𝑖, 𝐶ℎ 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑛𝑒, 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
𝑎𝑐 ≠ > 𝑎𝑏 
𝑎𝑏 = 𝐶𝑖 (𝑎𝑏 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
 
These assumptions form the foundation for the basic effort model, as we have seen in the 
last two sections. ab, ac, Ci and Ch are interval variables, which means that the distance between the 
levels is identical across the range. The same four variables only have values in nonnegative numbers, 
for the sake of both a realistic application and mathematical purposes. Ci and Ch are composed of 
one given variable. Imagine that every possible set of Ci and every possible set of Ch is labelled with a 
certain value20. This value is assumed to be knowable in this thesis. A person’s ac can never exceed 
his ab: he cannot exert more ac than his ability allows. The ab assumption holds that a person’s ab is 
determined beyond his control: he cannot change it. Under these assumptions the model can be 
constructed.   
(1) 𝑎𝑏 = 𝐶𝑖  
Ability effort ab under the ab assumption is a function of circumstances Ci: a person cannot alter his 
ab level, because this is based on this person’s Ci.  
(2) 𝑎𝑐 = 𝑑(𝐶𝑖) + 𝑒(𝐶ℎ) 
Activity effort ac is a function of both circumstances Ci and choices Ch. The distribution between 
these two factors is based on a chosen conception of the choice-circumstance distinction: the sum of 
d and e should be equal to one. If the relative weight of d increases (∆𝑑 + ∇𝑒 = 1), the influence of 
Ci on ac will also increase. If the relative weight of e increases (∇𝑑 + ∆𝑒 = 1), the influence of Ch on 
ac will also increase. Assume, as an example of (2), that the influence of Ci and Ch on ac is equal. (2) 
appears in the following form: 𝑎𝑐 = 0.5(𝐶𝑖) + 0.5(𝐶ℎ). When d is larger than e, Ci is believed to 
                                                          
20. e.g. A person with an average height, low intelligence, etc. (many more aspects could be added) is valued with a Ci of “5”, while a short 
person with a high intelligence, etc. is valued Ci of “4”. Or a person that chooses a out of possibilities a, b, c, d, etc. is valued with a Ch of 
“8” while a person that chooses b out of the same possibilities is valued with a Ch of “13”.  
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have more influence on ac than Ch. When d is smaller than e Ci is believed to have less influence on 
ac than Ch.  
(3) 𝑟𝑎𝑐 =  
𝑑(𝐶𝑖) + 𝑒 (𝐶ℎ)
𝐶𝑖
 
 
Since the absolute ac measure is equal to ac21, the last part of the basic model explains how relative 
activity effort rac should be measured. rac measures the degree of effort: how much of the 
maximum potential of ac (which equals ab, since 𝑎𝑐 ≠ > 𝑎𝑏) is actually transformed into ac? This 
model can be used in judgements of people on the basis of their possessed or exerted effort, which is 
illustrated by the following example.  
 
 
  
                                                          
21. The absolute ac is nothing more than the total amount of ac that is exerted. It is the value of ac in its pure form.  
Example of the basic effort level 
Assume that ac is a base for desert. Person A has a Ci of 20 because he was 
born into a privileged family. His Ch is 8 because he likes to work, but not too 
hard. Person B has a Ci of 8, because he was born into a disadvantaged family. 
His Ch is 6 because he likes to put effort in the activities he performs. In this 
example we choose that Ci should be twice as important as Ch in determining 
ac. This is the chosen conception of the choice-circumstance distinction.  
(1) 𝑎𝑏𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐴 = 20, 𝑎𝑏𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐵 = 8 
(2) 𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐴 =
2
3
20 +  
1
3
8, 𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐵 =   
2
3
8 + 
1
3
6 
(3) 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐴 =  
16
20
, 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐵 =  
7
1
3
8
   
Person A has an absolute ac of 16 and a rac of 80%. Person B has an absolute 
ac of 7
1
3
 and a rac of 91
2
3
%. When the absolute ac measure is chosen, Person A 
deserves more than Person B (16 versus 7
1
3
). When the rac measure is chosen, 
Person A deserves less than Person B (80% versus 91
2
3
%). 
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3. The conventional view on effort 
 
The model constructed in the previous chapter provides enough basis to continue with the 
presentation of three different views on effort. I start with the conventional view on effort, that is 
based on ‘popular opinion’. Here, popular opinion is an aggregate of individual views, expressed by a 
significant proportion of a community (Davison, 2015). Popular opinion does not have to meet any 
academic or philosophical standard: it is just a representation of the ideas held by a significant part 
of the population. Yet, the academic world should not ignore it, because a debate between the 
academic sphere and the public sphere is vital for progress (Swift, 1999). People have opinions about 
effort, its meaning, and its connection to other concepts that are meaningful for them. In the 
introduction we have seen that the popular beliefs about effort contrast with those of philosophers: 
the public embraces effort as a major base for desert, while the most influential scholars reject effort 
as desert base. This effort debate is recognized among the scholars. Rawls (2009: 328) admits that 
‘common sense’ favours distributions on the base of desert, of which effort could be one 
manifestation. Knight (2011: 153) defends the use of the desert in the justice and equality debate 
with the claim that desert approximates our intuitions about justice. Roemer (1998: 7-8) mentions 
the existence of a ‘common’ or ‘conventional’ view that favours equal resources for all persons and 
sees effort as a choice. Swift (2014: 40-42) has the most elaborate description of this conventional 
view22. According to Swift the conventional view on effort hold that “those who can do (and do do) 
things others are willing to pay for deserve to be better off than those who don’t.” Whether or not 
the origin of these activities are an effect of factors beyond a person’s control is not relevant in the 
conventional view (Swift, 2014: 41). Hence, the naturally gifted sprinter who deploys this talent 
deserves more than the average person, because he is more talented. The scholars’ suspicions of 
popular beliefs are backed by empirical evidence (Marshall et al, 1999; Miller, 1992).    
 
Yet, in order to assess the merits of the conventional view on effort more clarity is needed. 
Which set of beliefs together form the conventional view? Swift’s (2014: 41-43) description of the 
conventional view is chosen as a starting point, but shall be adjusted in order to approximate the 
popular beliefs on effort in Western culture even more. People ascribe many different matters to the 
concept of effort23. Effort is an achievement, a condition for compassion and compensation, an 
ability that everyone possesses in at least some form and a praiseworthy activity all together; the 
                                                          
22. Strictly speaking Swift’s conventional view is based upon the public’s vision on desert, of which effort is the form he discusses explicitly 
(Swift, 2014: 41-42). Since this thesis is not about desert in general, but about the effort debate and whether effort should be a desert base 
(see chapter 1), this is not problematic. Also see footnote 7. 
23. Remember the many different definitions dictionaries give in order to define effort (see chapter 2.1).  
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public’s conception of effort is very broad and therefore incoherent. All these different 
interpretations of effort are part of the public’s conception of effort. This thesis’s construction of the 
conventional view on effort tries to approximate the popular opinion on effort as much as possible. 
Yet, it is impossible to prove that this is the right interpretation of popular beliefs of effort, because 
not all members of the public hold the same beliefs and data on popular effort views is scarce 
(Marshall et al, 1999: 351). The main conclusion and base of the conventional view is that effort is a 
suitable desert base (e.g. McLeod, 2013). The conventional view on effort will be sketched with the 
help of the distinguished kinds of effort from the last chapter.   
 
 The conventional view on ab starts with the notion that nobody has an ab value of 0. Every 
person, even children or severely disabled people, has the ability to exert a minimum of effort. The 
dominance of this view can be found everywhere around us: remember the two examples of how 
Dutch society treats veterans and social security claimants, or education systems where toddlers are 
being tested (Zeeman, 2013). ab is often regarded as something what can be developed by choice, as 
is the case in self-disciplining. This notion is opposite of the ab assumption, although this tension can 
be lifted easily: all the surplus ab a person develops on top of his initial ab was already possessed by 
this person in the abilities distribution, although it was unmanifested until it was developed. Hence, 
ab is the maximum ability a person could develop. The conventional view accepts the idea that 
circumstances could affect a person’s ab. It may be true that anyone possesses some form of ab, yet 
the size of this ability depends on circumstances. Thus, conventionalism favours rac over absolute ac, 
as I will show later in this chapter. A reflection of this conventional belief can be found in the 
observation that society does not expect to find the same level of ab by a surgeon and his terminal 
patient. The conventional view rejects ab as a base for desert, because there should be no reward for 
unmanifested, yet present effort24. ab is unmanifested, yet present effort: it could be developed into 
ac, but without this transformation it is worth nothing according to the conventional view.     
 
 The exertion of ac is in the conventional view a praiseworthy activity and seen as a 
precondition for most achievements. The public regards (the exertion of) ac as a virtue, and 
reflections of this view can be found at multiple places in cultural expressions. From Aristotle 
(Johnson & Reath, 2012: 88) and the Holy Bible (e.g. Proverbs 13:4; 1 Corinthians 15:58; Galatians 6:9 
King James Bible) to the fairy tale of Cinderella (Perrault, 2010), numerous motivational quotes 
(‘Quotes on Effort’, 2015; ‘Effort Quotes’, 2015) and MTV Made (e.g. MTV Website, 2015): making an 
                                                          
24. Swift (2014: 40-41) incorporated this part of the conventional view implicitly in his description of it (italics added): “(…) the idea [the 
conventional view] that those whose productive activities can command a high price in the market deserve the money others are willing to 
pay them” and ”(…) it [the conventional view] is sympathetic to the idea that those who can do (and do do) things others are willing to pay 
for deserve to be better off than those who don’t (…).” According to Swift an activity is needed for desert.  
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effort, independently of its result, is praiseworthy and deserves reward. Hence, the claim that the 
conventional belief regards ac as a base for desert is defensible, and comes closer to actual public 
morals than Swift’s (2014: 40-42) description of the conventional view, where the focus is on results. 
ac is also regarded as a condition for achievement, as stated not only in multiple motivational 
quotes25, but also in scientific articles (e.g. Carbonaro, 2005; Tester & Campbell, 2007: 673).  
 
The conventional view accepts both measures of ac. Absolute ac is accepted because all 
effort requires physical and mental exertion, and this is, as we have seen, a praiseworthy activity. 
Yet, rac is also accepted by conventionalism and relates to what I called earlier ‘different forms of 
effort’ (see chapter 1). The public accepts that not everyone is able to make an equal amount of 
absolute ac, due to differences in circumstance. However, this view is coupled with the conviction 
that everyone has to try to make an effort, and that everyone is able to try within their abilities. How 
hard one tries is independent of circumstance in the conventional view: people are expected to try as 
hard as possible and circumstances cannot be used as an excuse26. Combining conventionalism with 
absolute ac appears as contradictory: conventionalism accepts the role of circumstance in the realm 
of ab, so why would it reject its implication in the realm of ac? Conventionalism favours rac as a 
measure, because this does justice to the effect that circumstances have on a person’s ab.  
 
An important question is whether the transformation of ab into ac depends (more) on choice 
or (more) on circumstances in the conventional view. The conventional view is inclined to value 
choice more than circumstance: ac is more a function of choice than of circumstance, as we have 
seen above. It is true that conventionalism supports the ab assumption and the rac measure. Yet, 
although the degree of effort does account for the influence of circumstances, thereafter it is all 
choice what matters: choice is, according to conventionalism, circumstance-free27 in the relative 
measure. Conventionalism expects, and believes that the ability of transforming ab into ac is equally 
distributed among persons. In other words: solely choice determines the rac a person exerts. This 
last analysis answers two major questions. First, it is clear that the conventional view argues that 
choice and circumstance are distinguishable. Conventionalism accepts that circumstance plays its 
part in the distribution of ab. Yet, after this phase it is mainly choice that matters, which shows that 
choice and circumstance are two distinctive concepts in conventionalism. Second, the conventional 
                                                          
25. e.g. : “All growth depends upon activity. There is no development physically or intellectually without effort, and effort means work.” or 
“No one succeeds without effort. Those who succeed owe their success to perseverance” (“Effort Quotes”, 2015).  
26. Examples of this have been discussed in chapter 1 (mainly taken from the Dutch government). 
27. Because the rac measure relates every person’s ac (a function of both choice and circumstance) to ab (a function of circumstance) one 
could conclude that the effect of circumstance is disabled in the rac measure. When the rac of two persons are compared (in the same 
conception of the choice-circumstance distinction) the only possible difference can be found in the e(Ch) part of the ac formula (3). Also 
see chapter 2.3.  
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view denies that circumstances can influence the exerted amount of ac: it claims that relative effort 
is circumstance-free. Conventionalism tends to believe that the rac measure is adjusted for 
circumstance, and that every person has – within the borders of their circumstances – the same 
ability of transforming ab into ac. In sum, effort is more about choice than circumstance in the 
conventional view.  
 
  The conventional effort model 
 
(1) 𝑎𝑏 = 𝐶𝑖 
(2) 𝑎𝑐 = 𝑑(𝐶𝑖) + 𝑒(𝐶ℎ) 
(3) 𝑟𝑎𝑐 =  
𝑑(𝐶𝑖) + 𝑒(𝐶ℎ)
𝐶𝑖
 
(4) 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝑒 > 𝑑 
Person A has a Ci of 4 and a Ch of 3. The conventional input (4) prescribes 
that Ch determines ac more than Ci, for example e is 0.6 and d is 0.4. This 
is the chosen conception of the choice-circumstance distinction. Person A 
has an ab of 4 and an ac of 3.4. The rac of Person A is then 85%.  
Note that increasing the relative weight of e in (e + d) decreases the rac in 
cases where a person has an ac lower than his ab. Increasing the relative 
weight of d in (e + d) increases the rac in cases where a person has an ac 
lower than his ab. 
 
In its most absolute form the conventional input for d is 0. In this case 
circumstances play no role whatsoever in (2): 
(2) 𝑎𝑐 = 𝐶ℎ 
(3)𝑟𝑎𝑐 =  
𝐶ℎ
𝐶𝑖
 
In this case Person A has an ac of 3 and a rac of 75%.  
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4. The extreme view and Rawls  
 
The ‘extreme’28 view on effort is the opposite of the conventional view on effort (Swift, 2014: 
42). Swift’s (2014: 42-44) extreme view puts much more emphasis on circumstance than the 
conventional view. It stipulates that effort cannot be a desert base because effort is (mostly) an 
effect of circumstance (Swift, 2014: 42). The extreme view rejects judgements on the basis of 
circumstances. Thereby, choice and circumstance cannot be disentangled because they influence 
each other heavily. Hence, it is impossible to know whether a person’s ac was an effect of choice or 
circumstance. Swift (2014: 43) argues that Rawls is sometimes presented as an exponent of this 
extreme view, yet Rawls never posed a view on effort explicitly. However, a set of bits and pieces, 
found in his justice theory, reveal the contours of Rawls’s stance on responsibility, desert and effort. 
Cohen (2011: 9-13) and Swift (2014: 43-44) have used these contours to develop a view that might 
reflected Rawls’s thoughts on these subjects. Rawls is notorious for his ambiguous statements about 
responsibility, desert and effort (Swift, 2014: 43; Cohen, 2011: 9-13). Since Rawls is not alive any 
more, there is no easy solution to these ambiguities. Rawls cannot be fitted into the extreme view 
without harming his actual position29. For example, Rawls does not make a distinction between 
choice and circumstance, which is a key point of the extreme view. In order to overcome these 
problems I have divided this chapter into a section about the thoughts of Rawls that are relevant to 
this thesis and a section about the extreme view on effort.  
 
4.1. Rawls on effort  
 
 The extreme view is based on Rawls’s theory and the conception of his theory (e.g. Cohen, 
2011: 11-12; Swift, 2014: 43-44). In the chapter’s introduction, we saw that the extreme view is often 
presented as Rawls’s view (Cohen, 2011: 11-12; Swift, 2014: 43-44). The extreme view and Rawls’s 
ideas are not the same, mainly because effort is not a main theme in the work of Rawls. His theory of 
justice defends a methodology and a set of principles about distributive justice. The whole realm of 
desert, responsibility and effort is mainly ignored by Rawls. Some passages of Rawls’s theory are 
dragged into the choice-circumstance debate by others, such as Cohen (2011: 11-12) or Nozick (1974: 
                                                          
28. Swift (2014: 41) has named this view ‘extreme’, which is a misleading term due to the connotation of the word ‘extreme’.  He chose it 
because this view is extreme for most people, who support the conventional view (the conventional view is based upon public opinion). 
This thesis adopts Swift’s categorization of the effort views in conventional, extreme and mixed (Roemerian in this thesis). Also see chapter 
1.  
29. e.g. I believe that Cohen (2011: 11) is right and Nozick (1974: 213-216) is wrong in their review of Rawls’s true standpoint on these 
topics, but this may be more a matter of taste than of truth. Roemer (1998: 30) also has an interpretation of the Rawlsian view, but his 
focus there is to contrast Rawls’s difference principle and his equality of opportunity. These discussion lies outside of the topic of this 
thesis, and will not discussed in further detail here.    
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174, 213-216). Rawls (2009: 329) rejects rewarding effort: this is impracticable and conflicts with his 
principles of justice. It is this idea of Rawls that luck egalitarians have transformed into ‘Rawls’s’  
rejection of the existence of the choice-circumstance distinction (Knight & Stemplowska, 2011: 5; 
Arneson, 2011: 28). The discussion of this interpretation of Rawls’s view has no relevance for this 
thesis. However, the remarks that Rawls himself made about effort are important contributions to 
the effort debate.   
 
The most clear and outspoken remark of Rawls (2009: 329) on effort is his rejection of effort 
as a desert base: “the effort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills 
and the alternatives open to him. The better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to strive 
conscientiously, and there seems to be no way to discount for their greater good fortune. The idea of 
rewarding desert is impracticable.” Rawls (2009: 137) rejects judgements that are based on 
endowment, because these are morally arbitrary. According to Rawls, this is the case when we 
reward effort, because the possession of ab and the exertion of ac is (partly) based on natural 
abilities and skills, or in this thesis: circumstance. Judgements on the basis of the ab distribution 
would be avoided in the original position (Rawls, 2009: 64-69). Yet, on another occasion Rawls gives 
more room to people’s choices and responsibilities: he argues that people have some responsibility 
in manifesting their abilities in order to reach desired goals (Rawls, 2013: 186; Cohen, 2011: 10). This 
conflicts with his more clear rejection of effort as a base for desert, since this suggests that people 
could be judged by the effort they make. The difference between these passages is the root of the 
confusion on Rawls’s view on effort.  
Rawls (2009: 329) claims two theorems that are important for this thesis and for the extreme 
view on effort. First, Rawls rejects — in the eyes of Cohen (2011: 11-12) and Swift (2014: 43-44) — 
the possibility of a distinction between circumstance and choice. It is impracticable to make a clear 
‘cut’ between a person’s abilities and a person’s alternatives: it is impossible to know which part of 
effort is the effect of abilities (in our terminology ab, a function of circumstance) and which is the 
effect of alternatives (in our terminology the choice factor in ac). The second claim of Rawls is more 
complex. Rawls (2009: 329) argues that the relationship between ab and ac is progressive: the more 
ab a person possesses, the more ac he will exert, both in relative and absolute terms. A person 
possessing a high ab level is more likely to transform his ab into ac. In other words, ab, a 
circumstance, determines (a large part of) ac. Assume that Rawls’s first claim was rejected — i.e. 
choice could be distinguished from circumstance30 — in order to shift the discussion into the realm of 
                                                          
30. Or, if we reject Cohen’s (2011: 11-12) interpretation of Rawls (2009: 329), abilities could be distinguished from alternatives in 
judgements about effort.  
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rac and absolute ac. Rawls obviously rejects the absolute ac measure because this measure is 
poisoned; it rewards a person with the ability to exert a high amount of effort while this same person 
received this ability beyond his control. This is morally arbitrary, and is therefore rejected by Rawls. 
Yet, Rawls also rejects the rac measure, because the degree of ac exerted also depends on the 
abilities of a person. This progressive relation between ab and ac causes pollution in the rac 
measure: it is not circumstance-free. The interesting point here is that Rawls rejects ac as a base for 
desert on two grounds: the more general objection that rewarding effort is impracticable and the 
more specific objection that ac is a progressive reflection of ab. The first objection is the main topic 
of chapter 6.1, and the second will be discussed in chapter 6.2. 
4.2 The extreme view on effort  
 
Rawls is a source of inspiration for the extreme view, which rejects effort as a desert base 
(Swift, 2014: 42). Does this conviction apply to both kinds of effort? The extreme view, which rejects 
all judgements on people on the basis of circumstance, i.e. matters beyond their control, as morally 
arbitrarily, would certainly reject ab as a desert base. Under the ab assumption, ab is distributed 
among people beyond their control (Swift, 2014: 42-44). Hence, ab is rejected as a base for desert 
because the distribution of ab is a circumstance and people should not be judged on the basis of 
circumstances. In the extreme view the amount of ab a person possesses is irrelevant, because it is 
determined by circumstance. ac is viewed differently in the extreme view: it is a function of both 
choice and circumstance. The extreme view sees ac as an activity whose existence depends on the 
abilities of the actor, and therefore claims that ac is more an effect of circumstance than of choice. 
Both measures of ac are rejected. The absolute ac measure is rejected because this measure ignores 
the influence of circumstance, which is a major one according to the extreme view. The rac measure 
is rejected by the extreme view, because it supports the progressive relationship between ab and ac. 
According to the extreme view, the rac measure fails to account fully for the progressive relation 
between ab and ac.   
 
Hence, the key points of the extreme view are very explicit, and are based on Rawls’s 
remarks about effort. Effort cannot serve as a base for desert because both ab and ac are, at least 
partly, an effect of circumstances. Choice and circumstances cannot be distinguished because they 
influence each other heavily31, as expressed in the progressive relation between ab and ac. The 
adoption of this relation causes the rejection of the rac measure because it is not circumstance-free. 
                                                          
31. Note the contrast with the conventional view, where the influence of circumstance stops after the distribution of ab.  
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The only route that could yield an embrace of effort as a desert base — and thereby secure the 
support of the extreme view — is a measure of ac that is circumstance-free.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The extreme effort model 
 
(1) 𝑎𝑏 = 𝐶𝑖 
(2) 𝑎𝑐 = 𝑑(𝐶𝑖) + 𝑒(𝐶ℎ) 
(3) 𝑟𝑎𝑐 =  
𝑑(𝐶𝑖) + 𝑒(𝐶ℎ)
𝐶𝑖
 
(4) 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝑒 < 𝑑 
Person A has a Ci of 4 and a Ch of 3. The conventional input (4) prescribes that Ch 
determines ac more than Ci, for example e is 0.3 and d is 0.7. This is the chosen 
conception of the choice-circumstance distinction. Person A has an ab of 4 and an 
ac of 3.7. The rac of Person A is 92
1
4
%.  
Note that increasing the relative weight of e in (e + d) decreases the rac in cases 
where a person has an ac lower than his ab. Increasing the relative weight of d in 
(e + d) increases the rac in cases where a person has an ac lower than his ab. 
 
In its most absolute form the extreme input for e is 0. In this case choice plays no 
role whatsoever in (2): 
(2) 𝑎𝑐 = 𝐶𝑖 
(3)𝑟𝑎𝑐 =  
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑖
= 1 
In this case Person A has an ac of 4 and a rac of 100%. In its most absolute form 
the extreme view rejects choice entirely: only circumstances matter. Hence, the 
rac is always 1, because ab and ac are equal.   
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5. The Roemerian view on effort 
 
The conventional view on effort, that accepts ac as desert base, is incompatible with the 
extreme view on effort, that rejects effort as base for desert. This incompatibility of both views is 
undermined by Roemer (1998) and his view on effort. The classic effort debate between the public 
who regards effort as an important base for desert and the extreme view that rejects effort as a 
desert base is revived by Roemer’s view on effort. Roemer (1998: 1, 15-16) developed a theory of 
equality of opportunity that wants to ‘level-the-playing-field’ to an extent where only differences in 
exerted rac between persons are a just ground for different outcomes between persons. All other 
differences are labelled as circumstance, and should not be held against (or for) people. Hence, 
Roemer is an exponent of the luck egalitarian tradition (e.g. Roemer, 1998: 21), that tries to integrate 
responsibility into Rawls’s theory of justice (Knight & Stemplowska, 2011: 4). Equality of opportunity 
is a reflection of Cohen’s equality of access to advantage32 (Roemer, 1998: 21), and Roemer rejects 
Dworkin on the same grounds as Cohen (Roemer, 1998: 19). Roemer’s position should be interpreted 
as an exponent of  the ‘mixed’ view on effort (Swift, 2014: 41). Roemer places effort, other than 
Cohen (2011), Dworkin (2000) and Rawls (2009), in the centre of his theory. Roemer developed an 
effort theory that relies both on circumstance and choice. The Roemerian view on effort could be 
paraphrased into a single argument: effort only should be a desert base when it is free of the effects 
of circumstance33, which is, at least theoretically, possible. Roemer presents this idea in his theory of 
equality of opportunity, which I shall discuss in the next paragraphs. Roemer’s (1998: 3-4) view on 
effort is far more economically and mathematically34 stated than the other two views on effort; this 
means that Roemer relies more on controversial assumptions and hypothetical models, which raises 
questions about the value of his ideas in practice. These questions shall be discussed in chapter 6.3. 
This chapter will cover respectively Roemer’s theory of equality of opportunity, the Roemerian view 
on effort, Roemer’s take on how to measure effort and choice-circumstance distinction and an 
appraisal of the value of Roemer’s effort view.   
 
Roemer’s stance on effort is, as we shall see, a logical outcome of his broader theory about 
equality of opportunity. Roemer (1998: 1) argues that there are two major conceptions of this theory 
in Western democracies. This first is the non-discrimination principle, which is similar to the 
                                                          
32. Therefore, I assume that Roemer’s (1998) definitions of circumstance and choice are not different than those of Cohen (2011) and 
chapter 2.2 of this thesis.   
33. Also see footnote 27.  
34. Roemer’s mathematical conversion of his philosophical theory is largely ignored, because it holds no relevance for this thesis: here, we 
mainly discuss whether or not effort should be a desert base in the first place. Roemer (1998: 3-4) admits that he focusses more on the 
economic aspects of this debate and the philosophical aspects may be underexposed. This thesis tries to shed more light on the 
philosophical aspects.   
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argument Rawls (2009: 101) formulated in his second principle of justice: social and economic 
inequalities should be attached to offices and positions that are open to all. Whether people are 
qualified for a certain position or office should depend on whether a person possesses relevant 
abilities for that position or office. All persons who possess these relevant abilities should be 
permitted into the pool of possible candidates, and should be judged only on their performance of 
these relevant attributes. Roemer condemns, just as Rawls, situations where people are 
discriminated for other reasons than their performance on relevant abilities. Yet, this conception of 
equality of opportunity is too limited according to Roemer (1998: 1, 4), and he advocates the 
levelling-the-playing-field conception35. Roemer (1998: 2) distinguishes first between the output (i.e. 
results) and the input (i.e. resources, such as talent), and then separates internal resources, such as 
genes or social environment, and external recourses, which can be supplied, such as trainers and 
education. The levelling conception advocates that shortfalls in internal resources should be 
compensated in external resources. Yet, after this compensation people should be held accountable 
for the achievement (or non-achievement) of the advantage that is desired. In the levelling 
conception there is always a ‘before’, where levelling is required, and an ‘after’, where the extent of 
levelling is sufficient whereby people are on their own. Different conceptions within the levelling 
conception place the moment where the ‘before’ ends and the after ‘begins’ at different places. 
Different moments of placing this division correspond with different conditions that should be met in 
order to close the ‘before’ and start the ‘after’. Roemer (1998: 2-3) does not choose a location of 
such a place but tries to provide a framework which can be used to do this. His aim is to formulate a 
theory of equality of opportunity that is pluralistic and could be used in discussions about this 
question. Yet, this framework is not flawless, as we shall see. Roemer (1998: 5) argues that 
circumstances that affect a person’s ability to achieve (or access) the desired advantage should 
certainly be levelled off, because people should not be held accountable for circumstances, for the 
same reasons as Rawls discusses (2009: 137). Equality of resources, where all persons receive the 
same amount of resources, is rejected by Roemer (1998: 6) because this solution does not account 
for differences in the degree people use resources efficiently. Combining this with the idea that 
people should be held accountable at some point Roemer formulates the main problem he tries to 
solve: when are people unable to process resources efficient, i.e. due to their circumstances, and 
when are people able to do so but choose to not do so, i.e. due to their choice? Roemer (1998: 6) 
argues that differences in achievement (i.e. result, advantage, success) due to circumstance should 
be levelled off, and differences due to choice should not. Roemer (1998: 7) assumes then we could 
                                                          
35. I shall call this conception the levelling conception.  
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know this, by which he supports the possibility of the existence of the choice-circumstance 
distinction.  
 
Roemer (1998: 7-9) converts the ideas discussed in the previous paragraph into a model, that I 
have used as inspiration for the basic model of effort. The different circumstances that determine 
abilities are represented as different vectors and differences between people in their circumstances 
are expressed as different values on those vectors. The population can be divided into types, 
whereby each type represents a certain combination of values on the vectors. Within a type the 
circumstances are equal, so all the differences in outcome between people within a type are an 
effect of choice. People within a type should receive equal resources (Roemer, 1998: 7-8). Each type 
has a different distribution of effort36, due to the circumstances, i.e. vector values, of the type 
(Roemer, 1998: 7, 11). Effort is, as I shall discuss in the next paragraph, the method by which access 
to an advantage can become a real advantage. Translated to the definitions I use this is mainly ac, 
although ab is a condition for ac. Roemer (1998: 11-12) has coined the term relative effort, which he 
sees as circumstance-free ac. The position a person occupies on the relative distribution of effort 
within his type is his own choice (Roemer, 1998: 7). Persons that exert the same relative degree of 
effort across types should receive equal advantages37 (Roemer, 1998: 10, 13, 15-16). Roemer (1998: 
6, 9) acknowledges that there are practical difficulties in applying this model, which shall be 
discussed in chapter 6.3. Roemer’s (1998: 15) equality of opportunity is desert-based: a person’s 
propensity to exert effort, with respect for his circumstances, is what should be rewarded. Roemer 
(1998: 17-18) then distinguishes between accountability and responsibility, to clarify why 
circumstance-free effort should be a desert base. This distinction is somewhat superfluous, because 
it only shows that people should not held accountable for behaviour that roots from circumstances, 
which he already argued (Roemer, 1998: 13, 15-16) and was done more convincingly by Cohen 
(2011). Roemer (1998: 20-23) ends the philosophical part of his book with a series of examples that 
challenge his theory. Again Roemer defends his theory with his core argument: people should only be 
held responsible for deliberate and circumstance-free choices.   
 
Effort is crucial in Roemer’s theory of equality of opportunity. Roemer (1998: 24) sees effort 
as the method where access to advantages (Cohen, 2011: 4) becomes an actual advantage, and as an 
expense for a person to achieve a certain advantage. This consideration of effort as an expense, i.e. 
                                                          
36. e.g. The average ab in type A is 6, while the average ab in type B is 10.  
37. Formally Roemer (1998: 11, 27-28) call this the ‘equality of opportunity policy’, which “maximins for every centile π the achievement 
level of all those at the π-th centile of their type distributions of achievement.” In other words: those who spend more effort, receive more 
achievement.   
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an activity that has costs, fits well with the conventional belief where effort is praiseworthy and 
linked with exertion. However, Roemer (1998: 26) rejects the view that effort is always painful. 
Roemer (1998: 7-12) believes it is possible and commendable to make a distinction between effort as 
an effect of circumstance and effort as an effect of choice. Differences in outcome, i.e. achieved 
advantages, are only justifiable when they originate from differences in the selected relative exertion 
of effort by people (Roemer, 1998: 15-16). ab is a circumstance, because Roemer (1998: 5, 11-13) 
assumes that this ability is distributed beyond a person’s control. In the Roemerian view, ab is not 
only simply the ability to exert some physical or mental activity in order to achieve a desired goal, but 
also the ability to process the resources that are needed in order to perform these activities within a 
certain time (Roemer, 1998: 6). Roemer (1998) does not explicitly reveal the progressive relation 
between ab and ac that Rawls (2009: 329) advocated, but this relation fits into the general theory of 
Roemer which acknowledges the demotivating effect of negative circumstances38. People with a 
higher ab level can perform either (or both) more activities or relatively more activities within a 
certain time, or the same amount of activities with less resources. The Roemerian version of ab is 
thus far more inclusive than the basic definition I have developed in chapter 2.1, and shall be called 
ab’. Roemer transforms ab into a concept that is multi-dimensional: it does no longer only consist 
out of the ability to perform mental or physical activity in order to achieve a desired end, but also out 
of the ability to transform these abilities and the intensity of these abilities. The benefit of this 
inclusive ab’  is that is seems to sweep circumstance out of the realm of ac and into the realm of ab. 
The drawback is that Roemer’s ab’ becomes a multi-dimensional and thick concept, which 
complicates the discussion on ab and ac. Roemer rejects ab as a desert base, because it is 
determined by circumstance and only circumstance-free effort can serve as a base for desert 
according to Roemer.  
 
ac is the type of effort that approaches Roemer’s definition of effort the nearest, because one 
could interpret ac as the method in which access to advantage, is transformed into actual advantages 
(i.e. results). ac is both an effect of choice and circumstance. Circumstances determine a significant 
part of the ac a person exerts. Yet within the boundaries of a person’s circumstances — i.e. the 
distribution of effort within the type this person belongs to — a person is free to choose a certain 
amount of effort (Roemer, 1998: 7, 15). This is nothing more than the absolute ac and rac distinction: 
the effort that is exerted in general should not be taken as measure (i.e. absolute ac), because then 
there is no compensation for circumstance. Since Roemer has developed the rac measure he is a 
                                                          
38. Roemer (1998: 14) explicitly discusses the negative effect of parents who believe that education is meaningless on the relative effort 
their children are likely to spend, which comes close to the Rawls’s progressive relation (see chapter 4.2): people with a low ab (due to 
their circumstances) are likely to exert less act than those with a higher ab. Yet, Roemer misses the demotivation effect of a low ab level 
after the distribution of ab has taken place, as I shall argue in chapter 6.2.  
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strong supporter of it and argues that rac is circumstance-free. Due to Roemer’s inclusive definition 
of ab (i.e. ab’) his ac is more circumstance-free that the one Rawls (2009: 329) attacks. Yet, as we 
shall see in Section 6.2, Roemer’s ab’ and rac still ignore the essential part of the progressive relation 
between ab and ac. Roemer (1998: 15-16) argues that ac could serve as a base for desert when the 
measure of this desert is circumstance-free.  
 
In the Roemerian view, results are approached rather unusual. Roemer (1998: 16) argues that 
those who exert an equal degree of rac should receive equal outcomes. Hence, the concept of result 
is strictly limited: results should only depend on rac, and all results that are (also) a matter of 
circumstance (such as luck and talent) cannot be categorized as results. This view gets around the 
problems of result and effort as I listed them in chapter 2.1: the pollution in the expressions of result 
and the complex and unknown relation between effort and result. Roemer circumvents these 
problems by arguing that all fractions of a result that are not an effect of rac should not be counted 
as results. For Roemer all judgements on result root from the judgement on the rac measure: results 
are simply another expression of the rac measure. Roemer cuts many corners in his defence of this 
view. For Roemer ac does not seem an attempt, but a guarantee for a result. A person who exerts 
more rac than average should receive more advantage than average (Roemer, 1998: 15-16). ac is 
therefore always productive and successful in the sense that the transformation from ab into ac 
always lead to results. Hence, effort, the method that changes access to advantage into real 
advantage, is infallible for Roemer39. This is problematic because unsuccessful ac does exist, even in 
the examples that Roemer uses40. Another problem is that Roemer does not respond to the complex 
relation between effort and results, where the amount of (either relative or absolute) ac is far from a 
reliable predictor for the result. Roemer does not address these issues, apart from posing a set of 
assumptions that will be discussed in chapter 6.3.  
 
 Roemer’s view on effort is, despite the flaws we came across, nothing short of a 
breakthrough in the debate on effort. It is a dazzling representation of what Swift (2014: 43) calls the 
‘mixed’ view, and combines the best parts of the conventional view with the elements of the 
extreme view: both choice and circumstance determine the effort one can exert or possess, and ac 
can be a base for desert when it is circumstance-free. The rac measure, claimed by Roemer and 
conventionalists as circumstance-free, should be used as a measure of ac. Roemer argues that, when 
measured in rac, ac should be a desert base. Roemer admits that a distinction between choice and 
                                                          
39. Roemer (1998, 16): “(…) if two actual persons with different circumstances exert the same degree of effort, their propensities to expend 
effort are the same, and they should therefore receive equal rewards – equal outcomes, whatever the outcome in question.”  
40. Children who follow an education are not always successful in getting a degree: their ac is not always successful. Roemer (1998: 5-15) 
uses his education example a lot without referring to this reality. Also see chapter 6.3.    
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circumstance is difficult to realize in practice. But at the same time Roemer’s entire theory is built 
upon that distinction and seems to reject Rawls’s (2009: 329) critique on it. The Roemerian view on 
effort provides a view between those who reject that effort is (mostly) based on one’s circumstances, 
i.e. the conventional view, and those who reject that effort is (mostly) a matter of choice, i.e. the 
extreme view. I support Roemer’s effort view, because it approaches reality and the ideal of justice 
much more than the simplistic conventional view, where choice is everything and people are always 
responsible for their lack of making an effort, and the grim extreme view, where circumstances are 
so dominant that there is almost no room for choice and responsibility. Yet, Roemer’s view on effort 
is not truly defensible in this initial version, due to the issues that Roemer did not discuss or solve 
thoroughly enough. In the next chapter I try to improves Roemer’s effort view.  
 
  
The Roemerian effort model 
 
(1) 𝑎𝑏′ = 𝐶𝑖′ 
(2) 𝑎𝑐 = 𝑑(𝐶𝑖) + 𝑒(𝐶ℎ) 
(3) 𝑟𝑎𝑐 =  
𝑑(𝐶𝑖) + 𝑒(𝐶ℎ)
𝐶𝑖′
 
 
Person A has a Ci’ of 4 and a Ch of 3. Assume that d and e are equal to each other (i.e. Ci’ 
influences ac as much as Ch). This is the chosen conception of the choice-circumstance 
distinction. Person A has an ab of 4 and an ac of 3.5. The rac of Person A is 87
3
4
%.  
Note that increasing the relative weight of e in (e + d) decreases the rac in cases where a 
person has an ac lower than his ab. Increasing the relative weight of d in (e + d) increases the 
rac in cases where a person has an ac lower than his ab. 
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6. Improving the Roemerian view 
 
6.1. Are choice and circumstance distinguishable?   
 
In the previous chapter we came across problems that need to be addressed before 
Roemer’s view on effort can truly be declared defensible. In this chapter I will discuss the most 
prominent problems and try to solve them. The first two problems are part of what I call the double 
distinction problem. Roemer´s view on effort is based on two distinctions: it claims that choice and 
circumstance can be distinguished from each other (Roemer, 1998: 13-16) and it claims that choice 
and circumstance are distinguished in the measure of relative effort (Roemer, 1998: 11-12). Both 
claims are rejected by Rawls (2009: 329). This section is about the first distinction problem, Rawls’s 
objection that choice and circumstance cannot be distinguished41. The next section is devoted to the 
question whether the rac measure is circumstance-free. In the last section of this chapter I respond 
to the practical limits of Roemer’s effort view. 
 
The most essential part of the double distinction problem that taunts Roemer’s effort view is 
based on Rawls’s (2009: 329) argument that effort cannot be a base for desert, because the factors 
of effort — in his view, abilities and alternatives, and in this thesis, circumstance and choice — 
cannot be distinguished from each other. Both the conventional and Roemer’s effort view depend 
heavily on the assumption that choice and circumstance can be distinguished. The conventional view 
is not really engaged in this debate because it just represents public beliefs that are not required to 
meet any internal logic or academic standard. From the conventional view of, for example, ab, we 
can infer that this view does not agree with Rawls’s objection (also see chapter 3). Nevertheless, 
Roemer’s effort view could be interpreted as a philosophical attempt to defend the use of effort as a 
base for desert, and should meet these standards. Roemer (1998: 7) assumes that it is possible to 
distinguish choice and circumstance, at least in the realm of effort. Roemer neglects to defend his 
assumption, and this weakens Roemer’s effort view. I separate two levels of Rawls’s critique that 
choice and circumstance cannot be distinguished. The first level rejects the possibility of a theoretical 
distinction between choice and circumstance because they are always interrelated. I reject this view, 
and agree with Roemer that a theoretical distinction of choice and circumstance is possible. 
However, I admit that the second level of Rawls’s critique is almost unfeasible: in practice, choice and 
circumstance cannot be distinguished. Roemer (1998: 7-8) agrees with these difficulties, although he 
never admits that this distinction is impossible in practice (also see chapter 6.3). I will now defend 
                                                          
41. Following Cohen’s (2011: 11-12) interpretation. Also see footnote 30 and chapter 4.1.  
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why Rawls’s notion that choice and circumstances cannot be theoretically distinguished should be 
rejected.  
 
Rawls (2009: 329) denounces rewarding effort, because it is impractical to isolate freely 
chosen effort (i.e. alternatives). A hypothetical distinction of choice and circumstance is successful 
only when the two variables are independent of each other, when choice is circumstance-free and 
circumstance is choice-free at the moment of judging, i.e. when one ‘makes the cut’ (see chapter 
2.2). Realising such a situation is hard, because circumstance and choice influence each other heavily 
prior to this hypothetical judgement. Circumstances are influenced by choice. A migrant choosing to 
move to another country which then becomes the scene of war five years later will influence the 
circumstances of that migrant. Choices are even more influenced by circumstance, because 
circumstances determine the limits and range of the options at a person’s disposal. In the two 
extreme perspectives of chapter 2.2 this problem is solved by oversimplification: all situations 
depend completely on choice, or all situations can be traced back to circumstances. For a more 
realistic point of view, where choice as well as circumstance determine situations, there is no such 
simple solution. Roemer (1998: 20-22) admits to this problem but provides no further solution. 
Cohen (2011: 32) argues that an absolute distinction42 is not necessary to make judgements. The 
question of which choices are genuine is not the right one, because choices are never completely 
circumstance-free. What matters is to what extent a disadvantage actually depends on circumstance-
free choice: it is a matter of degree (Cohen, 2011: 32). This question is more easy to answer when 
more information on the situation that has to be judged is available. Cohen (2011: 12) also presents 
an application of this idea when he defends his conception of Rawls, in which the degree of a 
situation that deserves reward is expressed in a percentage. Cohen’s suggestion can be summarized 
by the argument that the distinction of choice and circumstance may not be absolute, but should be 
used to make better normative judgements. Roemer (1998) does not mention any of these thoughts.  
 
I believe that Cohen (2011: 32) is right, although I also think that a distinction is possible in 
theory when the definitions of choice and circumstances are clear. In this thesis choices are 
somewhat dependent on circumstance, because before the process of choosing starts, some 
alternatives are already excluded from this process due to circumstances43. Yet after circumstances 
played their part there could be circumstance-free choice: the process in which ab is transformed 
into ac has to be theoretically constructed in different phases to distinct choice and circumstances 
                                                          
42. The distinction between choice and circumstance is absolute when (1) the effects of choice on circumstance are entirely accounted for 
in the conception of circumstance that is used for normative judgements and (2) the effects of circumstance on choice are entirely 
accounted for in the conception of choice that is used for normative judgements. Also see chapter 6.2.  
43. See chapter 2.2.  
28 
 
when considering effort. The theoretical construction of different phases in the effort model make a 
distinction between choice and circumstance possible. In the first phase, circumstances that 
determine ab are distributed among persons beyond their control. Then, in the second phase, the 
effects of circumstance on choice should be accounted for. After this, choice and circumstance are 
theoretically distinguished. An example of this phasing is performed in the next section, in the 
discussion about whether or not the rac measure is circumstance-free. Roemer (1998: 2) used a 
similar phasing method in his theory of equality of opportunity, as we already saw in the discussion 
on the ‘before’ and ‘after’ in chapter 5.  
 
Rawls (2009: 329) may argue that any nonabsolute distinction of choice and circumstance is 
useless, as choice then is not circumstance-free, but I do not see why my definition of choice could 
not be construed as circumstance-free. Moreover, I agree with Roemer that a system that rewards 
people on the basis of their exertion of circumstance-free ac is more attractive than a system that 
does not reward people but considers everything governed by circumstance. In the first system there 
may be cases where circumstance is rewarded or not compensated, but in the second system there 
may be cases where people become victims of the choices of others (e.g. people who prefer luxury 
cars ‘due to’ their circumstances). I prefer the first system, which may have some flaws, but is not 
unjust by definition, as the latter system that rejects that there is room for deliberate and genuine 
choice in many situations. For all these reasons I suggest that Rawls’s denial of any distinction 
between either choice and circumstance or abilities and alternatives should be rejected, because it 
prevents the adoption of the more just and realistic, although not perfect, view of Roemer.  
 
6.2. Is relative effort circumstance-free?  
 
 The second part of the double distinction problem originates from Roemer’s (1998: 11-12) 
claim that the rac measure is circumstance-free: the distinction between choice and circumstance is 
complete and successful in the rac measure. In many ways this problem is an application of the larger 
debate about the choice-circumstance distinction that was the central to the last section. Rawls 
(2009: 329) rejects that the rac measure is circumstance-free because it lacks the essential point in 
the progressive relation between ab and ac. The conventional view accepts a simple measure of rac, 
which corrects the amount of ac people exerted for differences between people’s ab levels, while at 
the same time rejecting the progressive relation between ab and ac44. I believe that Roemer could 
                                                          
44. See chapter 3.  
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and should accept Rawls’s critique on the degree of effort, and that conventionalism defends an 
awkward, half-hearted position. In the following section I explain why. 
 
The conventional view and Roemer both advocate the use of rac as measure for ac, because 
it corrects for differences in ab between people. Rawls rejects this approach because it would fall 
short of its objective: the relation between ab and ac is proposed by Rawls (2009: 329) as 
progressive. Circumstances also affect how hard one tries, i.e. their degree of effort. This rejects the 
view that rac is circumstance-free. Roemer (1998: 11-12) accepts this progressive relation, and tries 
to account for it by constructing a very inclusive version of ab (i.e. ab’): the ability to transform ab is 
included in ab’ (also see chapter 5). Yet, this ab’ does not challenge Rawls’s objection. Roemer (1998: 
15-16) attempts to judge people on the basis of their rac or, as he calls it on several occasions, ‘how 
hard one tries’ in a relative measure. The progressive relation of Rawls suggests that a person with a 
low ab level, say 5 when the average is 20, is demotivated to transform this ability into action 
because the fruits from his labour will be rather small. Why should a person exert a relative degree of 
effort close to 100%, i.e. an absolute ac value of 5 in the example, if his gains are negligible? Rawls’s 
progressive relation argues that a person with a high ab level can achieve much more when he 
transforms a high degree of effort, while a person with a low ab level still achieves modest results 
with the same degree of effort. Thus, a person with a high ab has a larger propensity to transform his 
ab into ac. The Roemerian response might be that, since all justifiable differences in outcomes should 
derive from differences in relative ac, there is no problem: people are judged only on the basis of the 
degree of effort they have expended. This suggestion is at odds with reality45 and self-defeating 
because there is not a single reason why people in such situations would choose to exert less relative 
effort than the maximum. This renders the rac measure superfluous. Rawls (2009: 329) simply points 
out that even the degree of trying is partly determined by circumstance, because it makes no sense 
for people with a low ab level to try hard. Because Roemer’s (2009: 15-16, 24) main aim is to reward 
effort that is circumstance-free, he should include the progressive relation between ab and ac fully in 
his rac measure that is so central to his theory. Roemer’s (1998) use of the concept of trying is 
ambiguous, and incorporates the progressive relation between ab and ac in his conception of ab. 
This is a dead-end strategy because one can only account for this relation after knowing the ab level, 
which could be achieved by the phasing solution of the previous section. I believe Roemer’s effort 
view is more about the amount of rac that could be reasonably be expected (see Roemer, 1998: 14) 
than about the height of the rac, and therefore the measure of rac should be changed.  
  
                                                          
45. If Roemer’s suggestion were true we should reward lazy brilliant artists less than industrious naïve artists.  
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Theoretically speaking, replacing the rac measure for a measure that incorporates the 
progressive relation between ab and ac is not very difficult. The old rac, ac divided by ab, should be 
multiplied with a factor that accounts for the demotivating effects of a low ab level. This factor, that I 
call the expected transformation factor (etf), has a value between 0 and 1 and is computed by 
subtracting the rac value from 146. The new ac measure rac’ is the product of the rac measure and 
the etf47.  A person with a high ab level is expected to be very motivated to transform his ab into ac, 
i.e. this person has a low etf. This is because he could receive extraordinary advantages if he 
transformed his abilities fully: this circumstance should not be rewarded and his low etf causes that 
his rac’ is lower than his rac. Hence, the rac’ measure corrects for the effects of the progressive 
relation between ab and ac. A person with a low ab value is expected to be demotivated to 
transform ab into ac, i.e. this person has a high etf. Even if this person exerts his maximum rac , the 
gains from the advantage would be average or even marginal: this circumstance should be 
compensated and his high etf causes that his rac’ is higher than his rac. Again, the rac’ measure 
compensates for the effects of the progressive relation between ab and ac. Note that it is necessary 
to know a person’s ab value in order to determine his etf48. The rac’ measure of ac is circumstance-
free and incorporates Rawls’s progressive relation between ab and ac. 
 
 Conventionalism rejects the rac’ measure, because it compensates for a low relative 
transformation of ab into ac if a person has a high ab level. One of the central ideas of 
conventionalism is that exerting effort is praiseworthy, should be rewarded and is expected of all 
persons. All persons have to try at the same level, and people do not deserve compensation for the 
demotivation that follows from a low ab level. These ideas conflict with the conviction of 
conventionalism that circumstances influence the amount of ac a person exerts. I believe this notion 
should prevail in the conventional view on effort; once you admit that a person’s circumstances 
influence the amount of ac he exerts there seems no reason to deny Rawls’s objection towards the 
original rac measure. One could counter that the possession of an ab level has no motivational effect, 
or that this effect is not circumstance-driven, but a matter of choice. I reject both objections, 
because I believe that ab is a circumstance and that there is a progressive relation between ab and 
ac. However, the conventional view ignores this part of the discussion on effort and defends a 
simple, but flawed vision. The extreme view could accept the rac’ measure, because it incorporates 
the progressive relation between ab and ac and is circumstance-free. Yet, the extreme view still 
rejects the underlying idea of the rac’ measure, because the extreme view rejects that choice and 
                                                          
46. Also see the improved Roemerian effort model below.   
47. 𝑟𝑎𝑐′ =  (𝑟𝑎𝑐)(1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑐). Also see the improved Roemerian effort model below.     
48 . Hence, the phasing method of chapter 6.1 is needed in order to calculate the rac’ measure.  
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circumstance are distinguishable49. Roemer’s effort view gains in strength when it incorporates the 
expected transformation factor etf, and should use the new rac’ measure.   
                                                          
49. Also see chapter 4.2 and 6.1.  
The improved Roemerian effort model 
 
(1) 𝑎𝑏′ = 𝐶𝑖′ 
(2) 𝑎𝑐 = 𝑑(𝐶𝑖′) + 𝑒(𝐶ℎ) 
(3) 𝑟𝑎𝑐 =  
𝑑(𝐶𝑖′) + 𝑒(𝐶ℎ)
𝐶𝑖′
 
(4) 𝑒𝑡𝑓 = 1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑐 
(5) 𝑟𝑎𝑐′ =  (𝑟𝑎𝑐)(𝑒𝑡𝑓) 
𝑜𝑟 (5) 𝑟𝑎𝑐′ = (
𝑑(𝐶𝑖′) + 𝑒(𝐶ℎ)
𝐶𝑖′
) (1 − (
𝑑(𝐶𝑖′) + 𝑒(𝐶ℎ)
𝐶′
)) 
Assume that ac is a base for desert, and that d is 0.55 and e is 0.45. This is the chosen 
conception of the choice-circumstance distinction. Person A has a Ci of 16 because he was 
born into a privileged family. His Ch is 12 because he knows that the fruits of his work are 
valuable. Person B has a Ci of 4, because he was born into a disadvantaged family. His Ch is 
2 because he knows that the fruits of his works are meagre.  
 
The rac of Person A is 81
1
4
% and the rac of Person B is 72
1
2
%. If we judge people on the 
basis of their rac value (as was done in the Roemerian effort model, see chapter 5) Person 
A deserves more reward than Person B.  
 
The etf of Person A is 0.1875 and his rac’ is 0.1523. The etf of Person B is 0.275 and his rac’ 
is 0.1994. If we judge people on basis of their rac’ value Person B deserves more reward 
than Person A. In other words: in the rac’ measure Person B is compensated for the 
demotivational effects of his low ab value, while the motivational effect of Person A’s high 
ab value is levelled off.     
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6.3. Roemer’s effort view and reality  
 
 Roemer’s effort view is a model constructed by an economist, which should in itself already 
trigger alarm bells when discussing its practical use. In this thesis we came across multiple hurdles 
that contest the application of Roemer’s effort view in practice. In this section I will summarize these 
obstacles, discuss possible solutions and reflect on the usability of Roemer’s effort view in the light of 
these difficulties.  
 
Roemer (1998: 7, 10) adopts, without much deliberation50, a set of three theorems that are 
vital for his model. The first obstacle is Roemer’s belief in the distinction between choice and 
circumstance on the practical level. An ‘actually existing’51 distinction between choice and 
circumstance is almost impossible to achieve without violating privacy and other human rights. Apart 
from this point of critique, which is also presented by the opponents of luck egalitarianism (Nozick, 
1974: 214; Knight & Stemplowska, 2011: 9-10), it is hard to know for sure which fractions of 
situations are traceable to choice-free circumstances or circumstance-free choices. I agree with 
Rawls (2009: 329) that this distinction is impractical, and I agree with Knight & Stemplowska (2011: 9-
10) that it is not worthwhile. Roemer’s (1998: 5, 14) position of such a distinction being hard to put 
into practice should be repositioned: such a distinction is empirically impossible and undesirable.  
 
A second problem is Roemer’s (1998: 7) assumption that effort is measurable as an interval 
variable. Throughout this thesis I have adopted this assumption (see chapter 2.1) because the 
discussion on a measure for (activity) effort is necessary to make progress in the effort debate. Yet in 
practice, effort is very hard to measure because effort comes in many forms. Some mental activities 
require other actions from a person than physical activities and vice versa52. This issue can only be 
solved when a whole system of effort measurements is introduced, independent from the themes 
discussed in this thesis. Such a system could, for example, adopt rules about how much effort each 
activity is worth, or that an activity only counts as effort-exerting when it is executed with a certain 
level of intensity. Note that these rules cannot be constructed on the considerations about effort in 
this thesis, but have to be developed independently. This is because all three views on effort are too 
loosely stated to foster such fine-grained considerations about the amount of effort yielded by 
various activities. I do not claim that such a system cannot be constructed, I only point out that it 
cannot be done without developing an complete effort evaluation system.  
                                                          
50. Roemer (1998: 7, 14) admits that these assumptions are ‘tall orders’ and difficult to realise, but pays no further attention to them.   
51. As in ‘actually existing socialism’.  
52. e.g. How can we compare writing a book to building a house in terms of effort?  
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The third obstacle that complicates the practical application of Roemer’s effort view is closely 
connected to the previous one. Roemer (1998: 7) assumes that effort is one-dimensional, while 
effort is actually expressed in many forms. An evaluation system that assigns effort values to certain 
activities — for instance one in which writing a forty-page cookbook equals 10 effort units and 
harvesting an acre of corn within four hours equals 20 effort units — is one-dimensional. It only 
focuses on the material expression of the activities but not on the difference in abilities between 
people. Due to these differences, people experience the same activity in completely different ways53. 
The fact that effort is expressed in many forms and is valued differently from different perspectives 
makes Roemer’s assumption of one-dimensional effort an illusion. The fine-grained system that 
could solve the objection that effort is not measurable has to be converted into a system so sensitive 
that it becomes overcomplicated and impractical. Moreover, an extra set of rules is needed to decide 
which perspective — e.g. that of society or that of the person who exerted the effort — should be 
used in judgements about effort. I believe that these conditions are almost impossible to meet, and 
that the combination of the second and third obstacle tackle most aspirations to use Roemer’s effort 
view in practice.   
 
The previous paragraphs show that the assumptions of Roemer (1998: 7, 10) either cannot 
be solved at all or can only be solved with the greatest difficulty or without any guarantee of success. 
Applying Roemer’s view on effort in practice is impossible in a strict sense. Yet, this does not mean 
that Roemer’s effort view is useless outside of the realm of political philosophy. The view should be 
used as a starting point for considerations on effort. The idea that effort should only be rewarded 
when it is optimally circumstance-free represents a huge shift from the dominant conventional view. 
Roemer’s view may never be fully implemented in policy, but it could be used as an inspiration for 
policy and political belief systems that want to attack the notion of rewarding circumstances. Cohen 
(2011: 11, 32) already explained that a system that rewards desert does not have to be absolute or 
complete to be valuable, and I agree with him. Roemer’s effort view is usable because it represents 
an integration of two sets of important insights, and is preferable to the other views, as my 
conclusion in the next chapter will explain.  
  
                                                          
53. A writer may exert significantly less effort in writing a book than a farmer, and vice versa when the desired goal is harvesting corn.   
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Table 1 
View on effort Conventional view  Roemerian view Extreme view  
Should ab be a desert 
base? 
No (it is a circumstance 
and it is unmanifested)  
No (it is a circumstance) No (it is a circumstance) 
Should ac be a desert 
base? 
Yes (exerting ac is mostly 
a choice and 
praiseworthy) 
Yes (when ac is 
circumstance-free it is a 
choice and 
praiseworthy) 
No (because ac is a 
function of ab, which 
was a circumstance)  
Is ac influenced by 
circumstances?  
Yes (but relative effort 
resolves this) 
Yes (but relative effort 
resolves this) 
Yes (and relative effort 
does not resolve this due 
to the progressive 
relationship between ab 
and ac) 
Should ac be measured 
absolutely or relatively?  
Both, preference for 
relative (relative effort is 
circumstance-free) 
Relative (relative effort 
is circumstance-free) 
None (relative effort is 
not circumstance-free)  
Is rac circumstance-free? Yes (it accounts for all 
the effects of 
circumstances) 
Yes (it accounts for all 
the effects of 
circumstances) 
No (due to the 
progressive relationship 
between ab and ac) 
Is rac’ circumstance-
free? 
Not applicable (rac’ is 
rejected because it 
compensates people 
who renounce to try)  
Yes (it defeats the rac 
measure because it 
incorporates the 
progressive relationship 
between ab and ac) 
Yes (but this does not 
matter because choice 
and circumstance cannot 
be distinguished) 
Can choice and 
circumstance be 
distinguished?   
Yes (without a real 
argument) 
Yes (at least 
theoretically)  
No (this is impossible: 
choice and circumstance 
influence at such a level 
of intensity that a 
distinction is impossible) 
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7. Conclusion 
 
 Roemer’s effort view defeats both conventional and extreme thought on effort. It 
approximates reality much closer than the other two views on effort because it values choice and 
circumstance adequately and does not lean toward any of the two factors of effort. The conventional 
view should be rejected because it refuses to compensate fully for differences between people 
caused by circumstances, and does not adopt Rawls’s progressive relation between ab and ac. 
Another problem with conventionalism is that it is not well thought-through, which in itself is not 
surprising as this view is based on popular opinion instead of on political philosophy. There is no real 
justification for why conventionalism takes a certain stance on many topics in the effort debate, such 
as the distinction between choice and circumstance. The improved version of Roemer’s view accepts 
the progressive relation between ab and ac fully and offers more arguments concerning the themes 
that conventionalism neglects, although some of them are not very convincing. I prefer the 
Roemerian view also because it takes circumstances into account more than the conventional view 
does: effort is a function of both choice and circumstance, not merely choice.  
 
The extreme view is defeated by Roemer’s effort view because its rejection of the distinction 
between choice and circumstance is not defensible on a theoretical level. The consequences of 
rejecting the existence of this distinction are extreme: effort cannot serve as a base for desert. 
Roemer’s view shows that this rejection is - in theory - not necessary. One of the major gains of the 
improved Roemer’s effort view is that it provides a philosophical defence of using effort as base of 
desert. The popular embrace of effort as a desert base is finally backed up by theory: circumstance-
free ac, i.e. the rac’ measure, should serve as a base for desert because ac is a praiseworthy activity 
that is often necessary to achieve advantage. When people are judged on the basis of the rac’ 
measure we reward freely chosen ac: the effects of circumstance are eliminated. Roemer’s improved 
view on effort is also preferable because choice is taken into consideration more than the extreme 
view does: effort is a function of both circumstance and choice, not merely circumstance.  
 
 Although Roemer’s effort view in its improved form defeats both other views, it still has 
major issues. Due to the many practical limitations of Roemer’s view, it is not implementable. It 
should, however, be used as the ideal starting point, because Roemer’s view defeats the other views 
and provides many insights that can be used for policy making and the political debate. Both the full 
adoption of the progressive relationship between ab and ac and the rejection of Rawls’s thesis that 
ambition and alternatives (circumstance and choice in this thesis) cannot be distinguished at all 
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improve Roemer’s view on effort. These two improvements have increased the strength of Roemer’s 
view on effort, which I can now fully support. With this conclusion, the aim of this thesis is achieved, 
but the debate on effort as a desert base should not end here. The model I have constructed around 
the two kinds of effort and the role of choice and circumstance when considering effort could be 
used as starting point to make progress in this debate and perhaps solve some of the problems that 
remain unresolved in Roemer’s improved effort view. 
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